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Abstract

This thesis will seek to demonstrate how the U.S.'s attempt to export democracy by leading the
NATO air campaign to overthrow Muamar el Gadafi in 2011 undermined U.S. foreign policy
goals producing regional instability and power vacuums. This work will attempt to summarize
the historical fragility of democracies, the cultural basis needed to establish a strong democratic
system, the tradition of autocratic government in the Middle East, and how all three of these
factors were largely ignored in overall U.S. planning and strategy in its intervention in the
Libyan Civil War. Finally, an alternative foreign policy criterion for assessing U.S. regional
objectives and strategy in the Middle East will be proposed that satisfies overall U.S. foreign
policy in promoting human rights and freedom while avoiding destabilizing actions and ensuring
U.S. geopolitical interests are secured.
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Foundational Failings: A Case Study on US Intervention Overseas
The U.S. has often been referred to as the policeman of the world, and not without
reason. At the end of the Second World War there was only one other global superpower than the
U.S. and it was diametrically opposed to American values and ideals in every conceivable
manner. The push to counter unchecked Soviet ambitions to establish a global Communist
empire led the U.S. to interfere in numerous foreign wars to varying degrees in both categories of
involvement and success. Throughout the Cold War era the U.S. had to approach its foreign
policy pragmatically, often making the decision to support an authoritarian ruler to avoid the
possibility of a Communist takeover. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the
U.S. has become far more indecisive and idealistic in its foreign policy, which has led to
disastrous consequences for not only U.S. interests abroad, but for the people of the nations in
which the U.S. has chosen to militarily intervene. The U.S.’s foreign policy objectives in Libya
and the greater Middle East has been severely undermined by its preoccupation with the
exportation of democracy.
Context of U.S. Interventionism
The practice of idealism-based interventionism was first introduced to American political
thought with the foreign policy of President Woodrow Wilson and his efforts to secure the right
to “self-determination of peoples” for many of the world’s disenfranchised through the Treaty of
Versailles and the creation of the League of Nations.1 Democratic governance and eventually
world governance was viewed as the objective as it was reasoned that if democracy were
achieved on a broad scale by most of the world’s nations, war would be much more easily

1

116-117.

Steve Martinot, “The Cultural Roots of Interventionism in the U.S.,” Social Justice 30, no. 1 (91) (2003):
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averted and diplomatic congeniality and peace would prevail.2 Wilson’s idealism, was not shared
by the Allies of the First World War or the American people voiced through Congress. Wilson’s
dream of a democracy filled world was largely shelved until the administration of Franklin
Roosevelt. At the end of the Second World War, the Wilsonian vision was revived in the creation
of the United Nations declaring the Self-Determination of Peoples its founding dual value along
with the sovereignty of the nation-state.3 However, the rivalry of the Soviet superpower forced
FDR and following administrations to be pragmatic in their strategic geopolitical foreign policy
decisions, allying with and supporting many leaders and regimes that did not share American
values and views on governance and rights. American foreign policy makers did so in view of
the long-term goal of preventing a complete Communist takeover, allowing for the possibility of
eventual democratic reform in otherwise autocratic allies in the future.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the Clinton administration
reintroduced Wilsonian idealism, humanitarian-based interventionism, and democracy
exportation through military means if necessary.4 In the succeeding administration of George W.
Bush, the overthrow Saddam’s Baathist regime and replacement with an attempt at Iraqi
democracy follows along these same idealist lines of thought. A similar situation developed with
the U.S. invasion and following 20 year-long occupation in support of the establishment and
maintenance of Afghani democracy, which promptly fell apart upon the withdrawal of American
troops in August of 2021.

2

Håvard Hegre, “Democracy and Armed Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 159.

3
Norman A. Graebner, and Edward M. Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and its Legacy: The Failure of the
Wilsonian Vision. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 60-64.

Nicolas Bouchet, Democracy Promotion as US Foreign Policy: Bill Clinton and Democratic
Enlargement, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 38-39.
4
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Despite the self-evident hazards, mixed returns, and immense burden of committing to
fight two ongoing wars of insurgency the Obama administration led a NATO coalition air
campaign in support of a popular Libyan uprising to overthrow their long-time dictator
Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The hope was that by enabling the rebels to enforce their demands
the formation of a new, free, democratic nation, would be fostered without making the costly
commitment of thousands of ground troops.5 What resulted was absolute chaos: Gaddafi was
brutally murdered, his forces crushed leaving a power vacuum with former Libyan government
forces and rebel groups fracturing into various warring factions that have continued the conflict
for the past decade.6 This instability and turmoil turned Libya into a haven for terrorists such as
Al-Qaeda and ISIS insurgents, and led to the assault on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi that saw
ambassador Chris Stevens and three other American nationals murdered. Foreign involvement
has only increased with various regional and global players intervening and supporting separate
factions in the civil war.7
This interventionist idealistic impulse is not wholly attributable to Wilson’s work and
vision. Throughout the American history prior to the World Wars, U.S. leadership and in turn its
populace have demonstrated an eagerness to go to war for what is viewed as a righteous cause or
crusade.8 This can be seen first in crafting of the Monroe Doctrine, one of the U.S.’s earliest and

Brett A. Larson, “The Conundrum between National and Ideational Interests in Foreign Policy Making:
Bureaucratic Politics and Operational Code During the U.S. Participation in Operation Unified Protector.” (PhD
diss., University of Colorado, Denver, 2013), 51, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.
5

Hamzeh Al-Shadeedi, et. al., One Thousand and One Failings: Security Sector Stabilization and
Development in Libya, (Clingendael Institute, 2020), 18.
6

7
Patrick Terry, “The Libya Intervention (2011): Neither Lawful, nor Successful,” The Comparative and
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 48, no. 2 (2015): 179.
8

Martinot, “The Cultural Roots of Interventionism,” 116-117.
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boldest foreign policy decisions in the Republic’s nascent years. Although there was an evident
pragmatism in implementing a policy that attempted to curb influence from the European Great
Powers in America’s proverbial backyard, a principled almost paternalistic attitude of protecting
the little guy from the playground bully is unmistakable in its creation and execution.9 This
ideological trend can be traced throughout most of the wars waged by the early Republic
continuing through the U.S. Civil War where both sides sought to justify their cause by declaring
they were championing the rights of the disabused and downtrodden (that of the States in the
case of the Confederacy and the enslaved in that of the Union).10 The First World War merely
witnessed a weaponization of this liberator fervor on an unprecedented scale. When the
Armistice and Treaty of Versailles revealed itself for the sham and unequal peace that it was,
with U.S. interests primarily disregarded, the American public realized it had been used as a tool
for the advancement of their Allies’ imperialist objectives and the backlash was swift and
decisive.11
The U.S. lapse into “isolationism” was temporary, however, and the Second World War
would see its return to the international stage in the place of foremost prominence. America’s
new unique position as the world’s leading superpower and de facto world policemen would only
enhance its liberator complex by bringing it into conflict with the spread of Communism in the
Korean War, Vietnam, and numerous proxy conflicts throughout the globe.12 Throughout its
conflict history both prior and post-World War II, the U.S. was and is distinctly anti-

Alex Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century,
(Palgrace Macmillan, 2020), 5-6.
9

10

Martinot, “The Cultural Roots of Interventionism,” 128.
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Graebner, and Bennett. The Versailles Treaty, 60-64.
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Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine, 205.
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imperialist.13 The American public had no stomach for the empire building clearly demonstrated
in its first attempt to do so in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War with its management of
the massive Philippine archipelago, its first and only serious colonial possession, which it
promptly promised eventual independence seeking only naval basing rights in return.14 This
distaste for colonialism and empire helped contribute to the impetus for U.S. championing of the
dissolution of its allies’ empires in the aftermath of the Second World War in deference to a wide
variety of peoples and leaders with unknown agendas and priorities. In many cases newly formed
states and regimes proved themselves enemies and opponents to America and its interests, yet
the U.S. commitment to anti-imperial thought continued to prevail despite its self-sabotaging
nature.15
The Middle Eastern Context
By contrast, the nations the U.S. has attempted to export democracy to via military
intervention in the last few decades have little next to nothing in common with America’s unique
situation. Iraq is a region that has served as the crossroads and intersection of empires for
thousands of years, dominated by its northern, eastern, or southern neighbors who command
strategic positions in the mountains of Anatolia, the Persian Plateau, or the buffer of Palestine
and the desert.16 The modern nation is hopelessly divided along ethnic, religious, and other
sectarian lines that have a recent and ancient history of hatred and violence perpetuated upon one

Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of
Terrorism. 1st ed. (Cornell University Press, 2015), 1-3.
13

14

Ibid., 88-89.

15

Ibid., 1-3

Henry G. Blake, Hugh Kennedy, John E. Woods, Majid Khadduri, and Richard L. Chambers,
"Iraq," Encyclopedia Britannica, 2022.
16
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another.17 Autocratic rule has been the norm for Iraq since the time of Sargon of Akkad, without
an iron hand to enforce cooperation between all of its varied peoples and ideologies there is no
other authority that unifies. The current democratic government established in the wake of
Hussein’s overthrow is plagued by corruption and has never truly attained national stability on its
own much less national homogeneity or domestic tranquility.18 Afghanistan’s democratic
experiment and ensuing dissolvement speaks for itself. Another crossroads of empires not only
divided along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines but interminably interrupted by a massive
maze of mountain ranges that inextricably link it to its domineering neighbors.19 This disruptive
geography has always lent itself towards disunity and decentralization which no empire of the
ancient or recent past has ever fully overcome, Kabul either remaining a distant outpost or seat of
a nation’s empire.20
Libya, has a similar context to these fellow Middle Eastern regions. Another cross road of
empires, the port cities of the Libyan coast have served as a critical way points for cross
Mediterranean trade and later safe havens for pirates. Libya’s extenuated coastline, vast open
deserts, powerful neighbors and lack of a hard boundaries facilitated its domination by foreign
influences throughout its history.21 Empires ranging from the ancient Egyptians to the Ottomans
having held sway over the region. Libya as a nation or even region would not be conceptualized

17
Johan Franzén, Pride and Power: A Modern History of Iraq, (London, England: C. Hurst and Company,
2021), 337.
18

Ibid., 388-390.

Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan a Cultural and Political History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2010), 23-25.
19

20

Ibid., 59.

Dirk J. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Second edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 53-55.
21
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as a unified whole until the Italian conquest of the Ottoman Tripolitania Vilayet taking the
traditional regional divisions of Tripoli, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan merging them under the title of
“Libya” a derivation of the word used by the ancient Greeks for the people of the region.22 This
tripartite division had roots in the open geography of the region as the coastal cities of Cyrenaica,
in the east were usually dominated and influenced by whatever power held sway over Egypt, and
the cities of the West domineered by powers based in Tunisia or its immediate northern
neighbors of Italy and Greece.23 The foremost sub-regional cities respectively were and are
Benghazi in the East and Tripoli in the West; during the truncated lifespan of the Kingdom of
Libya (1951-1969) both cities served as the nation’s dual alternative capitals.24 The Berber
peoples that inhabit the southerly deserts of Fezzan, have always remained semi-autonomous
from the coastal regions and whatever empire held sway at the time.25
In the aftermath of World War II, Libya was administrated jointly by France and Britain
until former Libyan resistance leader Emir Idris was granted the kingship of the newly formed
constitutional monarchy of the Kingdom of Libya in 1951.26 Thus began Libya’s first ever
experiment with a “democratic” form of government. The Kingdom’s constitution crafted under
U.N. oversight included a number of protective mechanisms designed to protect the rights and
freedoms of all Libya’s diverse citizenry and granting significant autonomy the state’s provincial

22

Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 62.

23

Ibid., 54.

24

Ibid., 85.

25
D. D. Cordell, Nevill Barbour, Gary L. Fowler, Mukhtar Mustafa Buru, and Brown, L. Carl,
"Libya," Encyclopedia Britannica, 2022.
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government; the end result was viewed quite favorably in the West.27 However, significant
power was vested in the monarchy permitting it to interfere with legislative processes leading the
path open to autocratic rule. This development did not take long, by the end of the first elections
in 1952 all political parties and their formation was banned.28 The main opposition party, which
had thoroughly lost in the general elections, was outlawed and its leader exiled. In response the
Libyan populace felt far more connected to their local provincial governments as they had more
of a say and there were incessant jurisdictional disputes between the King’s central government
and the provinces.29
The discovery of rich oil reserves in Cyrenaica in 1959 signaled a massive increase in not
only wealth but Western interest and support for Libya’s development; it would also add fuel to
the fire of the nascent kingdom’s preexisting and volatile sectarian divisions.30 With revenue
pouring into the state coffers from the exportation of oil Idris’ government moved to centralize
authority further by abolishing its decentralized federal form of government and the historical
tripartite division along with it in 1963. In their stead a unitary monarchy with a central
government whose power was all but absolute was adopted and the country divided into ten new
districts overseen by a governor appointed by the king.31 Growing dissatisfaction over the
centralization of wealth and power in the hands of the king and his inner circle, the rising
influence of Egyptian president Gamel Nasser and his Pan-Arab movement, combined with the

27

Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 85-86.

28

Ibid., 87.

29

Ibid., 86.

30

Ibid., 88.

31

Ibid., 102.
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unpopularity of the King’s continued alliance with the West in spite of the events of the 1967 Six
Day War and Israeli-Palestinian conflict culminated in a bloodless coup d'état by a number of
military officers led by Muamar al-Gaddafi.32
Declaring the establishment of the Libyan Arab Republic Gaddafi promoted Pan-Arabism
and a form of “direct democracy,” however Gaddafi and his pollical allies practically held all
power.33 The ban on political parties was not repealed, trade unions, and political dissent was
additionally banned and little actually changed as far as how things were run. Gaddafi and his
supporters ensured the people were constantly surveilled through a system of “Revolutionary
Councils” established throughout the provinces.34 In the same vein of many other popular antiimperial/Western uprisings the economy’s major industries such as oil were nationalized, foreign
companies expelled, and British and U.S. forces forced to leave abandoning the substantial base
complexes they had built up over the decades.35 Ethnic minorities that had succeeded in the
Libyan economy such as the Italian and Jewish communities that had formed much of the
nascent nation’s middle class had their property expropriated and were forced to flee in a
national holiday Gaddafi titled “Vengeance Day.”36 Riding high on the influx of funds from a
general rise in oil prices during the 1970s Gaddafi’s regime funded a myriad of internal social

32

Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 106-109.

Federal Research Division, Libya: A Country Study, 4th ed. Vol. 550-85; (Washington, D.C: The
Division, 1989), 42-43.
33

34

Ibid., 47-48.

35

Ibid., 46.
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and development projects as well as a massive military spending and the funding of numerous
insurgent and terror groups abroad.37
It did not take long for Gaddafi to draw the increasing ire of the U.S. as his antiimperialist and pro-socialist rhetoric combined with his funding of terrorist operations during the
height of the Cold War in the 1980s earned him a series of airstrikes in Operation El Dorado
Canyon.38 This combined with a general decrease in the price of oil globally led to the lessening
of Gaddafi’s incendiary rhetoric and revolutionary support. In the aftermath of the Cold War
Libya found itself increasingly isolated on the world stage despite attempts by Gaddafi to
ingratiate himself with the African Union.39 Libya remained under his domineering rule for over
forty years during which dissent, divisions, and any attempt at democratic reform outside central
approval was systematically quashed and repressed. Limited reforms were implemented, with
some privatization measures being adopted, political prisoners released, etc. in the 1990s, but
they failed to turn Libya’s spiraling economic conditions and rampant corruption around.40
Despite Libya’s near complete religious homogeneity with around 96% of the population
identifies as Sunni Muslim, the late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed an uptick in Islamist
activity as groups such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and others gained in domestic
influence.41 Throughout the duration of Gaddafi’s rule, the same sectarian, ethnic, and
geographical divisions remained under the thin veneer of Libyan anti-imperialist “unity” and

37

Federal Research Division, Libya, 50-51.

38

Ibid., 56-58.
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Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 175-176.

40

Ibid., 208-209.
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once his downfall was assured the nation quickly splintered along its East – West and tripartite
bifurcations.42
R2P, Intervention, and Fallout
The social upheaval of the “Arab Spring” initiated first in Tunisia quickly spread to its
next-door neighbor and throughout the entire Middle East. Gaddafi’s typical iron-fisted response
did not land well with an ideologically driven West. Seeking to capitalize on the region wide
revolutionary fervor, the U.S. and European nations supported the overthrow of many of the
Arab autocrats it found so distasteful to deal with despite the risks such actions posed to overall
regional stability.43 This manifested in either direct subversion via aid and assistance to
opposition forces or nominal statements of support and condemnation of autocrats and their
respective regimes.44 In face of such international and internal pressures lifelong presidents
began to resign, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to name the
most prominent. The result was a wave of political and security destabilization en masse
throughout the Levant and North Africa. Radical Islamist forces from ISIS to Iranian backed
Shiite militias grew and spread throughout the Middle East mixing with Western backed antigovernment forces. While these radical elements were not explicitly supported by the West, they
compromised any notion or hope that these popular revolutions would usher in an unprecedented

42

Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 203-204.

43

Larson, “The Conundrum between National and Ideational Interests,” 51.

44
Andrew Porter, "Arab Spring will add to extremism if we do not help, says David Cameron," The Daily
Telegraph, May, 2011. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/8539420/Arab-Spring-will-add-toextremism-if-we-do-not-help-says-David-Cameron.html.
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era of democratic Arab self-governance and pluralism.45 Old sectarian divisions reemerged with
a vengeance, and the case of Libya was no exception.
The impetus for U.S. and Western support for the Arab Spring and by extension its
intervention in Libya was based on ideological and not strategic considerations such as
maintaining a “balance of power.” The U.S. and West deemed itself protector of the growth and
spread of Arab “democracy” by countering those authoritarian rulers who were well equipped to
crush such popular protests and insurgencies. “To brush aside America’s responsibility as a
leader and – more profoundly – our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such
circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are…some nations may be able to turn a
blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United State of America is different.”46 Gaddafi,
while not propagating atrocities was holding on to power successfully unlike his strongmen
counterparts in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt who both resigned with minimal violence.
Gaddafi’s continued presence was viewed as a threat to the wider regional revolution. Speaking
on the Libya intervention Senator John McCain declared, “this intervention was both right and
necessary in light of the unprecedented democratic awakening now sweeping the broader Middle
East.”47
This sudden shift was a new development and reversal of recent U.S.-Libyan relations.
Since the early 2000s Gaddafi had cooperated by partnering with the U.S. in nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. As late as 2010, General William Ward head of

Mahmoud Gebril, "Libya: Will Stability and Order Be Restored? Why Things Got out of
Control." Contemporary Arab Affairs 9, no. 3 (2016): 347.
45

46
Scott Wilson, “Obama: U.S. had Responsibility to Act in Libya,” Washington Post. March 28, 2011.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-us-had-responsibility-to-act-inlibya/2011/03/28/AF6fkFrB_story.html.
47
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AFRICOM, referred to Gaddafi’s Libya as “a top partner in combatting transnational
terrorism.”48 Up until the revolutionary events of 2011, Gaddafi had been pursuing an amicable
relationship with the U.S. while softening repressive tendencies. His son and heir apparent Saif
Gaddafi, appeared to be a promising candidate for future gradual reform having declared in
2010, “I will not accept any position unless there is a new constitution, new laws, and transparent
election…everyone should have access to public office. We should not have a monopoly on
power.”49 The younger Gaddafi’s words were not empty either as he had been the primary source
of recent reforms facilitating the release of nearly all political prisoners, privatization of state-run
media, and introducing deradicalization measures for Islamists.50 Further, President Obama’s
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the time referred to Libya as “not a vital interest,”51 to U.S.
foreign policy. Despite these evident changes, Gaddafi had not reformed Libya fast enough for
the West; his presence and mere potential to resist overthrow with force was deemed
unacceptable as according to President Obama, failure to remove him would threaten “the
democratic impulses that are dawning across the region…as repressive leaders concluded that
violence is the best strategy to cling to power.”52 According to the words and actions of the
presidential administration and its key supporters leading up to and after the Libyan intervention,
U.S. involvement was based on ideological considerations rather than strategic security interests,

Alan J. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in
Failure.” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015): 72.
48

49

Ibid., 75.
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Ibid., 75-76.

51
Paul Harris, “Barack Obama Defends US Military Intervention in Libya,” The Guardian. March 28,
2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/barack-obama-us-speech-libya.
52
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which would have sought to maintain a relatively stable Libyan regime at least nominally open
to gradual reform.
President Obama, Senator John McCain and many interventionists argued that, based on
Gaddafi’s incendiary or “genocidal rhetoric,” failure to intervene would have resulted in human
slaughter comparable to Rwanda in the 1990s:
Gaddafi declared he would show “no mercy” to his own people. He compared them to
rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we had seen him
hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day. We knew if
we waited one more day Benghazi…could suffer a massacre that would have
reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.53
This narrative of brutal repression by Gaddafi’s regime did not match reality however. “Human
Rights Watch found that of the 949 people wounded there in the rebellion’s first seven weeks,
only 30 (just over three percent) were women or children, which indicates that Qaddafi’s forces
had narrowly targeted combatants, who were virtually all male.”54 A mere thousand rebel forces
were killed by the regime prior to NATO intervention. Despite grandiose threats and incendiary
rhetoric, in each city Gaddafi’s forces retook all who surrendered were promised humane
treatment and for the most part received it.55 Regime forces did not target civilians. By the time
NATO interfered the rebels were on the verge of defeat after a few weeks of fighting. There was
no shortage of misinformation by anti-regime and foreign influences alleging massacres had
taken place when none had occurred:
From March 5 to March 15, 2011, government forces recaptured all but one of the major
rebel-held cities, and in none did they kill civilians in revenge, let alone commit a
bloodbath. Indeed, as his forces approached Benghazi, Qaddafi issued public
53

Harris, “Barack Obama Defends.”
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reassurances that they would harm neither civilians nor rebels who disarmed. On march
17, he directly addressed the rebels of Benghazi: “Throw away your weapons, exactly
like your brothers in Ajdabiya and other places did. They laid down their arms and they
are safe. We never pursued them at all.”56
In contrast, once the U.S. and NATO started enforcing the UN sanctioned “no-fly zone,” the
fighting drew out for months and became increasingly brutal with rebel militias targeting
Gaddafi supporters indiscriminately civilian and soldier alike, while torturing prisoners. As a
result of foreign intervention, the death toll of the Libyan Civil War would jump astronomically
to over 10,000.57
As the anti-government protests progressed into armed rebellion it became apparent that
despite some initial gains by rebel groups their lack of organization and proper equipment would
lead to their ultimate defeat at the hands of the far better trained pro-Gaddafi forces.58 The U.N.
Security Council in the absence of Russia and China declared a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace
and a ban the deployment of foreign troops.59 This measure was implemented and enforced
primarily by the U.S., U.K., and France, but saw the participation of the NATO coalition as a
whole. The official basis for such an intervention took form in the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) doctrine within international law. The essential premise of this principle is based on three
assumptions or “pillars”: each state is responsible to protect its people from genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; all states are obligated to assist one another
in this responsibility to protect; any state that fails in its responsibility is liable to “collective

56

Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle,” 71.
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Ibid., 69.
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Paul Tang Abomo, R2P and the US Intervention in Libya, (Cham: Springer International Publishing,
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action” by the international community up to and including military invention in order to protect
its populace.60 The U.N. Security Council was granted sole authority to invoke the doctrine. A
rather intrusive international norm, but one adopted unanimously by all members the U.N.
General Assembly in 2005.61 It was developed in response to the international community’s
general indolence towards atrocities committed in the 1990s during the Rwandan and Srebrenica
genocides.
Proponents of R2P are quick to point out the differences between it and general
ideologically based interventionism, emphasizing the inherent collective nature of the process
and that armed force is to be used as an absolute last resort after all other diplomatic and
economic measures have been exhausted. The whole objective is to “protect” a given nation’s
populace, not to advocate for regime changes, occupy the territory, or take advantage of the
situation to advance one’s national interests.62 This was an extremely idealistic framework to
operate from that the ensuing conflict in Libya would repudiate as in practice every one of these
lofty objectives would be utterly ignored. The first abuse of the doctrine, would be its misuse to
ensure regime change.
Gaddafi’s regime was diplomatically isolated, which was why it was condemned by the
international community for its “brutal actions” against protestors and “genocidal rhetoric.”63
These combined with accounts of allegations of war crimes, but primarily the refusal by Gaddafi
to step down formed the basis for the U.N. Security Council’s invocation of R2P. “This denial

Jennifer M. Welsh, “Norm Robustness and the Responsibility to Protect,” Journal of Global Security
Studies 4, no. 1 (2019): 56.
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and continued defiance led the international community to adopt tougher sanctions. As a step
forward, Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd called for a no-fly zone over Libya…such an
action would clearly need international support and the means to enforce it.”64 The U.S. for its
part was already engaged in two wars of insurgency involving ground forces within the Middle
East and the administration was naturally cautious about being drawn into a third. The nature of
the Security Council’s use of R2P however, specifically banned the involvement of foreign
ground forces and called for the implementation of a neutral no-fly zone in Libyan airspace. This
provided an opportunity for the U.S. under the Obama administration to flex its support for
human rights and “democracy” while maintaining minimal commitment of human capital.65 The
ability to retreat behind the curtain of “collective action” and avoid bearing the brunt of any
potential fallout from the overall operation’s failure to achieve its ends also provided a
convenient political escape. This half-hearted commitment is best summarized in the President’s
own words: “The United States will not be able to dictate the pace and scope of this change.
Only the people of the region can do that. But we can make a difference. I believe that this
movement of change cannot be turned back, and that we must stand alongside those who believe
in the same core principles that have guided us through many storms.”66 Such a position, a denial
of responsibility, is untenable when one holds the power to determine the fate of a nation and its
leader and chooses to use it.
The ensuing devastation of the Libyan air force and air defense system proved critical in
weakening Gaddafi’s forces. NATO and U.S. support did not cease at mere enforcement of the
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no-fly zone however, as they aggressively targeted Libyan regime forces as they retreated
threatening no one and in tandem with rebel assaults and maneuvers.67 This instance of “mission
creep,” which could be more aptly titled “mission leap,” received broad international criticism as
the U.S. and NATO openly changed their tune and admitted they intended to use R2P to
facilitate regime change.68 By October, the result was a victory for the rebel opposition groups
and the extrajudicial killing of Gaddafi along with members of his family in his hometown and
base of support in Sirte. Yet the U.N. - recognized opposition government in the form of the
Transitional National Council (TNC) and its immediate successor interim government in the
General National Congress (GNC) failed to command the respect of the innumerable militias
spread throughout the nation. Its directive to disarm and join the nascent nation’s newly formed
armed forces were ignored.69 This refusal was due to a general distrust of the newly formed
government’s motives, ambitions, and former Gaddafi associates within said government. This
suspicion was combined with and compounded by a reluctance to lay down the arms that had so
recently won the rebel militiamen their “freedom.” Libya’s rebels soon fractured along
traditional regional, tribal, and ideological lines swiftly falling into fierce internal fighting and
civil war.
Islamist influence amongst many of these militias as elsewhere in the popular protests
and rebellions of the Arab Spring was prevalent.70 It generally contended with a more
nationalistic and secularized militarism in the vein of Gaddafi’s and other autocratic regimes as
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one of the determining ideologies in the fracturing of the Libyan opposition’s forces and
successor governments.71 ISIS and Al-Qaeda linked associate groups were widespread in the
immediate aftermath of the rebellion, one such group Ansar al-Sharia attacked the U.S. consulate
in Benghazi killing four Americans including ambassador Christopher Stevens in 2012.72 Events
such as these, as well as disputes between factions and militias over the nation’s oil resources,
only served to further undermine what little legitimacy and authority the first interim
governments did possess leading to the bifurcation of Libya that is seen today.
By 2014, two rival governments had formed, the House of Representatives based in the
eastern city of Tobruk backed by general Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA)
and the GNC splintered into the Islamist dominated National Salvation Government (NSG),
which for a time held the reins of power in Tripoli before being challenged by the former GNC’s
more moderate elements in the form of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and moving
its base of operations to Misrata.73 The eventual domination of and reincorporation of the
Islamist NSG and its militias into the GNA, which currently receives official U.N. recognition as
Libya’s government may have simplified internal politics somewhat, but it has also deepened the
divide between Tobruk and Tripoli.74
Accusations between the two sides and their myriad of militias have continued to fly
holding that the other is illegitimate. General Hafter and Tobruk claiming the GNA has been
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thoroughly infiltrated by radical Islamists and the GNA dismissing Haftar as a Gaddafi wannabe
and Egyptian puppet.75 A common dichotomy witnessed throughout the Middle East is being
replayed once again over the traditional East-West division of Libyan geography. The nation is
splintered between two ideological positions championing two different approaches to
government and hierarchy of values. Members of the House of Representatives in Tobruk
repeatedly emphasize the importance of bringing stability via the military’s moderating
influence, expulsing foreign forces/influences, and maintaining the secular nature of state
governance. The GNA on the other hand emphasizes the importance of implementing the Sharia
in all areas of life and governance, while inviting sympathetic Islamist Turkish armed forces into
the country. While moderates may exist on both sides, and both claim to strive for democratic
governance the reality is that any form of “democracy” that will be fomented by either party is
unlikely to be one that fully satisfies or reflects the West’s standards of pluralism, human rights,
equality, etc.76 What the U.S. and West is faced with instead is the option of supporting another
militaristic nationalist government’s take on democracy or that of a heavily Islamist influenced
and supported one.
Despite the expansive purview the R2P doctrine grants the powers taking “collective
action,” U.S. involvement in ensuring Libya’s populace was protected and the interim
government supported was minimal to non-existent.77 Western political leaders used the initial
success of the air campaign to overthrow Gaddafi as a podium to preach from on the virtues of
democracy and how Libya was a “model intervention”78 while the devastated state was engulfed
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in chaos. The nation descended in a death spiral of sectarian warfare, failed successor
governments, and transformation into a haven for terrorists.79 As these events unfolded and the
development of a functional democracy remained ever elusive and Libya became a by-word, the
subject no one within the U.S. foreign policy community wanted to touch and as a result the fire
of war continued to rage unabated. President Obama defended U.S. reticence to follow up on the
obligations undertaken with R2P explaining, “we went down that road in Iraq…but regime
change there took eight years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion
dollars. That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.”80 While ideological-based
interventionism is plagued with its own host of issues, failure to fulfill one’s word and
proclaimed goals is far worse as it displays weakness in an international system dominated by
power politics and a severe lack of moral character.
The U.S.’s failure to lead decisively and follow through on its initial interventionist
actions to help Libya’s nascent interim governments establish order, institutions, and legitimacy
produced a power vacuum that was soon filled by a multiplicity of foreign powers each pursuing
their own agenda.81 President Obama would later declare that failure to adequately prepare for a
post Gaddafi Libya was his “worst mistake.”82 The U.N.’s ban on the presence of foreign forces
was ignored almost immediately, and was violated repeatedly in the ensuing chaos and fracturing
of Libya’s rebel forces. From the beginning of the rebellion Qatar openly supported the anti-
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Gaddafi militias, sending aid, weapons, and military advisors for training purposes.83 As the U.S.
backed away from involvement its NATO and other affiliated major allies in the French, Italians,
Turks, Egyptians, and Saudis all took separate sides in the ensuing civil war. Other major and
regional players include Russia, Syria, the UAE, and even Iran with each having found
themselves allied with and against traditional enemies and friends alike.84
A Realist Alternative
Such has been the case throughout the Modern Middle East’s history for the last eighty
years. A mere handful of constitutional monarchies established by Western powers in its
decolonization efforts have survived out of the multitude originally founded and only then via
Western networks of extensive aid and military support. The U.S. and West’s options for
partners within this context tend to be either regimes run by often secular minded political and
military elites on the one hand or populist leaders on the other, who seem to inevitably be of an
Islamist persuasion at best ambivalent towards the West and openly hostile at worst.85 Rarely do
the populist movements that often accompany pushes for democratic reform and self-rule in the
Middle East share the values or favor the interests of the U.S. and its allies. These nations and
the region as a whole do not possess the West’s unique history, ideology, and set of
circumstances that have facilitated the growth of its rich tradition of self-governance. It is
foolishness and diplomatic suicide to attempt to preach the virtues of a Western model of
government and value system to a culture and society that simply does not possess the same
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norms but does have plenty of reasons to distrust powers that formerly dominated their lands so
recently.86 Such pontification merely comes off as a brazen attempt at imperialism, does little to
persuade, and has the opposite desired effect serving instead to only further alienate our allies
and enemies alike.
Ideological interventionism, specifically in the form of R2P is a dangerous and doubleedged doctrine. If followed to its logical conclusion then the responsibility to protect should be
invoked every time a nation abuses or oppresses any group within its population. Yet, if this
were the case the U.S. and other interventionist minded powers would be at war with more than
half the world including Russia and China. R2P and ideological interventionism as a whole
fundamentally construe and conflict with the American government’s true responsibilities abroad
as laid out in the Constitution: to protect U.S. citizenry and its fundamental foreign interests of
security. Despite its avowed stance that any state that “manifestly fails” in its protection
responsibilities subjects itself to “collective action,” R2P seems to be little more than a tool to be
utilized by the strongest world powers granted dedicated seats on the U.N. Security Council to
justify selective discipline of weaker nations.87 There is no practical way it can be invoked
against one of the Security Council members as they can simply veto it. Even if the hypocritical
triggering mechanism of R2P did not exist and it could be invoked by any power there is nothing
to stop China or Russia from invoking it against the U.S. for its say, failure to adequately protect
minority populations.
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When ideological interventionism is adopted and implemented based on unsubstantial
evidence and then followed by failure to see it through, the U.S. and its foreign policy is turned
into a joke. It displays duplicity first in that a nation the U.S. has partnered with one minute is
freely abandoned and turned upon in the next; and secondly, that U.S. commitment to protecting
a given people is only good so long as the conflict is brief and politically expedient. As
mentioned previously, Gaddafi had a recent history of cooperation with the West handing over
what advancements he had achieved in nuclear and chemical weapon development to the U.S. in
2003, and providing valuable assistance in counterterrorism efforts.88 The rapidity of the U.S.
and NATO to welcome an opportunity for his overthrow signaled to states such as Russia, North
Korea, and Iran, that any attempt to compromise with the West was fraught with peril. “Wellconnected Iranian, Abbas Abdi, observed: ‘When Qaddafi was faced with an uprising, all
Western leaders dropped him like a brick. Judging from that, our leaders assess that compromise
is not helpful.”89 The message communicated is that the U.S. is not afraid to and actively
negotiates in bad faith with its opponents.
In invoking the “responsibility to protect” the intervening powers were obligated to
ensure the Libyan populace’s protection. As far as can be accurately ascertained Gadafi and his
supporters were not murdering innocents in their repressions of rebel forces. Whether this was
evident to the Obama administration in the fog or war and propaganda is not clear, but according
to the President’s own words the intervention was a preventative in nature, “we knew if we
waited one more day Benghazi…could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the
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region,” based on rhetoric rather than demonstrative actions.90 If the U.S. and NATO had
refrained from entering in immediately, delayed judgment, while monitoring Gaddafi’s actions
closely, then intervention may very well have been avoided. While this may have counted as a
loss for “democracy” in the Middle East, what governing institutions Libya did possess would
have been preserved alongside its extensive security apparatus, while the gradual liberalization it
had been experiencing continued. In the worst-case scenario, where Gaddafi’s forces enter
Benghazi and suddenly reverse their operating procedure they had held throughout their entire
campaign and suddenly begin purging civilians, U.S. and NATO air forces present in the area
could have been activated and annihilated whatever force the Gaddafi could muster with pinpoint
accuracy.91 Such a policy was not pursued; while some attempts at negotiation by the U.N. were
made, U.S. and NATO leaders did not reason with Gaddafi, but simply delivered demands,
vilifying him from the start.92 When the intervention began the civilian death toll began to
rapidly rise and a decade later continues to do so as peace is ever elusive. Rather than accept
responsibility for its actions and attempt to ameliorate the fallout of interference via deployment
of ground forces or other measures to stifle the ensuing chaos, the U.S. backed away from its
responsibility at the nearest opportunity.93 This only served to further undermine U.S. security
interests, the second and third pillars of R2P, and America’s overall credibility as an ally.
If the U.S. is to have an effective policy that advances its interests and values abroad it
must start by recognizing that every society possesses its own hierarchy of values and interests it
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emphasizes above others and that is not inherently a problem. Good governance, cannot be so
narrowly defined to only include democracy: different peoples expect their respective
governments to deliver on the priority they value the most otherwise they are viewed as
illegitimate.94 For much of the Middle East including Libya, this priority is collective security or
stability above the rights and freedoms of individuals and groups within the nation, which is
often best delivered by some form of autocracy.95 Democratization efforts, however well
intentioned, often open the door for majoritarian rule and domination at the expense and to the
detriment of a given nation’s minorities.96
In order to avoid such risks of miscalculation and malignment there needs to be a
fundamental reorientation of the criteria used in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy alongside a
shift away from a short-term mindset. Clear communication of practical goals is required; these
goals must be based on the overarching criterion of stability.97 The U.S. should prioritize the
universally understood and appreciated criterion of stability to maintain the regional balance of
power rather than attempting to enforce the adoption and synthesis of its value and governmental
system by other nations, which has been a source of near constant confusion and strife.98 This not
only protects the security and general strategic interests of the U.S. and its allies in the Middle
East but overall protects and preserves human life.99 The instability caused by intervention in
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Libya has been the source of a massive refugee crisis, growth in regional terrorism, and
significant disruption of Europe’s energy sector where 70 percent of Libya’s oil exports were
directed before the war.100 If stability is communicated as the matter of first importance other
goals and interests will follow.
This is where a long-term mindset must be adopted for success to be achieved. Secondary
interests, such as human rights are more likely to improve as a given nation’s wealth and
prosperity increases and its ruling class becomes more lenient.101 Saudi Arabia for example, has
made advances in the realm of women’s rights and personal freedoms that while comparatively
minor to that in the West, is a success and an incremental development worth recognition. This
comes from one of the most fervent Islamist autocratic powers, but one that has seen consistent
improvements in its standard of living and overall prosperity.102 This approach may be far slower
and less evident that the radical and rapid reforms brought on by violent revolution and
overthrow of an oppressive dictator but they seem to be far more palatable to the people and in
turn long lasting as they originate within their nation and are not imposed by a foreign power.103
Maintaining stability is far easier to communicate than the confused jumble of
assumptions and ambitions within ideological interventionism and certainly more palatable to
nations that do not share Western values. Since the end of the Cold War these smaller autocratic
regional powers and states seem to be perpetually confused by the U.S. stance which fluctuates
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radically between nominal disproval to explicit armed aggression. While antagonistic powers at
times, Gaddafi’s Libya and Saddam’s Iraq both understood what was expected and desired of
them by the Cold War superpowers. Since the Cold War’s conclusion both actors fell afoul of an
ideologically interventionist minded West.104 The U.S. cannot completely divorce its values and
who it is as a nation from its foreign policy, however, it is capable of understanding outside
perspectives and working towards limited strategic objectives by brokering compromises that
sees its interests advanced without upsetting an entire region’s society bringing untold amounts
of chaos and destruction.
Conclusion
Ideological interventionism, democracy exportation, “Responsibility to Protect,” –
whatever its label, is a fundamentally flawed endeavor as it is plagued with tremendous risks,
requires a high degree of time and capital investment for there to be a chance of success. The
attitude that all nations should adopt the Western model of government is pure hubris at work: it
leads to the adoption of foreign policy measures that are counterproductive to the U.S.’s national
interests, and only succeeds in confusing friends and enemies alike further alienating ourselves.
Permitting nations to pursue their own path, including value systems and forms of government
and letting the resultant success and failure of states speak for themselves allows for human
flourishing and avoidance of embitterment over what is viewed as “imperialist” undertakings.
The case of U.S. and NATO’s intervention in Libya was especially egregious. It forms the
textbook example of how to undermine one’s foreign policy interests. Outside of dogmatic
considerations, the basis for humanitarian-based intervention is dubious at best. Libya erupting
into a bifurcated regional proxy state may have been somewhat inevitable due to its history and
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geography, but the primary role the U.S. played leading to the nation’s current state of affairs
was avoidable. The decision to then abandon the responsibility claimed by the U.S. that formed
the basis for intervention was a result of lack of forethought and planning, the effects of which is
still being felt to this day. Very few powers act like the U.S. does in this, and none do outside the
West: the Turks, the Russians, and the French, all know who holds their interests and are not
afraid to express explicit support wherever a given regime falls on the value and governmental
spectrum. If the U.S. is to be effective on the international stage, the Middle East, and Libya
specifically, it cannot commit to an eternal crusade for the expansion of the “free” world but
must set pragmatic limited objectives within the framework of preserving stability.
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